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ARE PRIVACY AND PUBLIC DISCLOSURE COMPATIBLE?:
THE PRIVACY EXEMPTION TO WASHINGTON'S FREEDOM
OF INFORMATION ACT-In re Rosier, 105 Wn. 2d 606, 717 P.2d
1353 (1986).
In 1972, Washington State voters passed Initiative 276, the Public
Disclosure Act,' by a substantial margin. 2 The initiative contained four
measures intended to open up government, 3 including one designed to
ensure public access to government-held records. 4 This measure, popularly
known as Washington's Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), provides a
mechanism by which individuals can access information held by the
government, subject to only a few exemptions. 5 One such exemption
prevents disclosure which is an "unreasonable invasion" of personal pri-
vacy.6 The Washington Supreme Court greatly expanded the scope of this
personal privacy exemption in In re Rosier.7 Prior to this decision, the
exemption had been interpreted potentially to exclude only information
which was highly offensive to a reasonable person. 8 After Rosier, any
information which is linked to an individual9 and which reveals something
"unique" about that individual' ° may be exempted, subject to a balancing
of the public and the private interest. 1 ' This expanded protection of privacy,
however, is both bad policy and an unwarranted interpretation of the
FOIA.12
The supreme court ought to interpret the privacy exemption in a manner
that acknowledges the specific circumstances which justify the protection
of the individual's privacy under the FOIA. Privacy ought to be protected,
for example, when the government has illicitly acquired the information,13
1. Initiative 276, 1973 Wash. Laws ch. I (codified at WASH. REv. CODE §§ 42.17.010-.945.
(1985)).
2. The initiative passed 959,143 to 372,693, an approval rate of 72%. WASHINGTON STATE
SECRETARY OF STATE, 1972 ABSTRACT OF VOTES 2.
3. The measures related to campaign financing, lobbyist reporting, reporting of public officials'
financial affairs, and public records. WASH. REv. CODE §§ 42.17.010-.945. (1985).
4. Id. §§ 42.17.250-.340.
5. See id. § 42.17.310(1) for the list of specific exemptions.
6. Id. § 42.17.260(1).
7. 105 Wn. 2d 606, 717 P.2d 1353 (1986).
8. Hearst Corp. v. Hoppe, 90 Wn. 2d 123, 135-36, 580 P.2d 246, 253 (1978). In addition to being
highly offensive, information had to be of no legitimate public interest to satisfy the Hearst test. See
infra note 35 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 75-86 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 87-104 and accompanying text.
11. See infra note 105 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 106-17 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 121-22 and accompanying text.
257
Washington Law Review
has promised confidentiality in order to get more accurate information, 14 or
when disclosure would chill the individual's exercise of fundamental
rights. 15 The privacy exemption should strictly protect privacy in such
circumstances. This interpretation would make disclosure more predicta-
ble, better protect privacy, and best implement the FOIA's main purpose of
assuring free and open access to government-held information.
I. WASHINGTON'S FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
Washingtons Freedom of Information Act provides a means by which
private individuals can access a broad range of government-held informa-
tion. The act requires agencies to make "all public records" available for
public inspection. 16 Individuals denied access to a public record may seek
de novo judicial review of the agency's decision. 17 The act specifically
instructs courts to take into account that "free and open examination of
public records is in the public interest, even though such examination may
cause inconvenience or embarrassment to public officials or others."' 8
Some information, however, is exempted from disclosure. Agencies are
directed to delete identifying details when disclosing a record "[t]o the
extent required to prevent an unreasonable invasion of personal privacy." 19
The act also exempts several specific categories of information relating to
personal privacy.20 Although purporting to protect a "right to privacy," '2'
the act does not attempt to define the phrase. 22 Thus, the statutory language
leaves unresolved the tension between the act's goal of ensuring free and
14. See infra notes 123-27 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 128-31 and accompanying text.
16. "Each agency... shall make available for public inspection and copying all public records."
WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.260(1) (1985).
17. Id. § 42.17.340(1). The act also gives the agency the burden of proving that it is required to
refuse disclosure. Id.
18. Id. § 42.17.340(2).
19. Id. § 42.17.260(1).
20. Id. § 42.17.3 10(1). The first of the specific exemptions absolutely protects personal informa-
tion in school, public institution, welfare, and prisoner files. The other exemptions, encompassing
employment, tax, and investigative files, protect information to the extent disclosure violates a "right to
privacy." Id.
However, the Revised Code of Washington provides that the specific exemptions are inapplicable "to
the extent that information, the disclosure of which would violate personal privacy . . . .can be
deleted from the specific records sought." Id. § 42.17.310(2). Thus even information which appears
absolutely protected by § 42.17.310(1)(a) may be disclosed if the requestor shows that disclosure does
not intrude upon any individual privacy interests. The combined effect of these two provisions appears
to shift the burden of proof with respect to such information from the agency to the requestor.
21. Id. § 42.17.310(2), (3).
22. "Privacy" is not included on the list of terms defined for purposes of the act. See Id.
§ 42.17.020.
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open access to government-held information, and its articulated desire to
protect individual privacy.
The disclosure provisions of Washington's Freedom of Information Act
are modeled in large part after the disclosure provisions of the federal
Freedom of Information Act.23 The federal FOIA, enacted in response to
agency abuse of the disclosure provisions of the Administrative Procedure
Act, 24 is designed to ensure broad disclosure of government-held informa-
tion. Key to this design is the provision requiring disclosure "to any
person." 25 Federal courts interpret this phrase to mandate release of infor-
mation without regard to the requestor's purpose in seeking it.26 Informa-
tion not exempt under Washington's act must likewise be made available
"to any person." 27
The disclosure exemptions in Washingtons FOIA, however, differ sig-
nificantly from the federal act, 28 particularly the privacy exemption. The
federal act's privacy exemption protects information, the disclosure of
which would be a "clearly unwarranted" invasion of personal privacy.29
Federal courts have consistently interpreted the phrase "clearly unwar-
ranted" to call for a balancing of interests. The right of any individual to
privacy is weighed against the public interest in disclosure of the informa-
tion; unless the scales clearly tip in favor of privacy, the information must
be made available. 30 This balancing necessitates inquiry into the purpose
for which information is sought, in order to weigh that purpose against the
privacy interest in the information to determine whether disclosure is
warranted. 31 Only the privacy exemption, due to its "clearly unwarranted"
23. Act of July 4, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1977)).
24. EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73,79 (1973); S. RE'. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1965).
25. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1977).
26. Federal courts have interpreted the "to any person" language of the federal FOIA to require that
every requestor receive identical access with respect to all but the privacy exemptions. 2 J. O'RELLY,
FEDERAL INFORMATION DIscLosuRE: PROCEDURES, FORMS AND THE LAW § 16.01, at 2 (1986).
27. WASH. REv. CODE § 42.17.270 (1985); 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1977).
28. The federal FOIA exempts nine categories ofinformation. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1977). Washing-
ton's FOIA exempts fifteen different categories. WASH. REv. CODE §§ 42.17.310(1), .315 (1985).
29. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1977).
30. Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 372 (1976); S. REP. No. 1219, 88th Cong.,
2d Sess. 7 (1964).
31. Originally, some courts evaluated and weighed the particular purpose for which the requestor
sought the information, rather than the generalized public interest in disclosure. See, e.g., Getman v.
NLRB, 450 F.2d 670, 677 & n.24 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
However, most courts now agree that the interest that ought to be balanced underthe federal FOIA is the
general public interest in disclosure, not the individual interest of the requestor and his or her particular
purpose for seeking the information. Columbia Packing Co. v. USDA, 563 F.2d 495,499-500 (1st Cir.
1977). A factor weighed in determining the public interest, though, remains the likelihood that the
requestor will use the information in a way that will benefit the public. Church of Scientology v.
Department of the Army, 611 F.2d 738,746 (9thCir. 1979); see Comment, The Freedom ofInformation
259
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language, overcomes the federal FOIA's broad requirement of disclosure
without regard to intended use.
The Washington FOIA, on the other hand, exempts information, the
disclosure of which is an "unreasonable invasion" of personal privacy.32
The language of Washington's act significantly differs from that of the
federal act. 33 The Washington Supreme Court, therefore, originally inter-
preted the privacy exemption in Washington's FOIA to arrive at a test
different from that used by the federal act. The test announced by the court
in Hearst Corp. v. Hoppe34 interpreted the "unreasonable invasion" lan-
guage to exempt information, if its disclosure would be highly offensive to
a reasonable person and if the privacy interest served by suppression
outweighed the public interest in release. 35 Unlike the federal privacy test,
which engaged directly in a balancing of interests, information under
Washington's privacy test had to first pass the threshold of being highly
offensive to a reasonable person before such balancing took place. 36
Washington's FOLA, as interpreted prior to Rosier, thus required the
disclosure of more information than did its federal counterpart.
II. IN RE ROSIER
The Washington Supreme Court broadened its interpretation of the
privacy exemption in In re Rosier.37 Rosier, who was campaigning for a
seat on a public utility district board, made an FOIA request of the utility
for a list of the names and addresses of all its customers. 38 The utility
refused to provide this information, alleging that disclosure would amount
to an unreasonable invasion of its customers' privacy interests. 39 Subse-
quently, the utility refused a police department's request for the power
Act's Privacy Exemption and the Privacy Act of 1974, 11 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 596(1976).
32. "To the extent required to prevent an unreasonable invasion of personal privacy, an agency shall
delete identifying details when it makes available or publishes any public record . "WASH. REV.
CODE § 42.17.260(1) (1985).
33. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
34. 90 Wn. 2d 123,580 P.2d 246 (1978).
35. Hearst, 90 Wn. 2d at 135-36, 580 P.2d at 253.
36. Under the federal act, the information may be relatively inoffensive but exempt from disclosure,
if the public interest in its release is yet weaker. See, e.g., Public Citizen Health Research Group v.
Department of Labor, 591 F.2d 808, 809 (D.C. Cir. 1978) ("The threat to privacy thus need not be patent
or obvious to be relevant. It need only outweigh the public interest.").
37. 105 Wn. 2d 606, 717 P.2d 1353 (1986).
38. Rosier, 105 Wn. 2d at 608, 717 P.2d at 1355. Rosier wanted to obtain the list in order to mail
campaign literature to the utility's customers. Opening Brief of Appellant at 12.
39. Rosier, 105 Wn. 2d at 608,615,717 P.2d at 1355,1359; Brief of Respondent Pub. Util. Dist. No. I
of Snohomish County at 1. The utility alleged that some individuals, such as police officers and women
residing at battered women's shelters, did not want their home addresses made available to the public.
Brief of Respondent at 8-10.
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consumption records of a particular individual suspected of growing mari-
juana in his home, although it had routinely provided such information
before. no
The supreme court granted both Rosier and the police department access
to the information each sought.41 However, in doing so the court articulated
new standards for the protection of private information from FOIA re-
quests. First, the court declared that the act contained a general personal
privacy exemption entirely distinct from any specific exemption. 42 Next,
the court stated that any information which identified "particular, identifia-
ble individuals as somehow unique from most of society" implicated a
privacy interest. 43 Finally, the court reaffirmed the propriety of balancing
the individual privacy interest against the public interest in disclosure. 44
The court held that the name and address list, while matching names with
information, did not identify individuals .as being "unique from most of
society."4 5 As to the individual power consumption record, the court held
that a privacy interest did inhere, and that the public interest in disclosure
outweighed the privacy interest only when police have an articulable
suspicion of an individual's illegal conduct.46
The Rosier standard represents a substantial broadening of the protection
of personal privacy interests under Washington's FOIA. A privacy interest
now encompasses potentially any information linked to an individual,
rather than only information which is highly offensive to a reasonable
individual. Washington's privacy exemption, as interpreted by the court in
Rosier, may now exclude more information from disclosure than its federal
counterpart.
40. Rosier, 105 Wn. 2d at 608,717 P.2d at 1355.
41. Id. at 609,717 P.2d at 1356.
42. Id. at 609-11, 717 P.2d at 1356-58. The opinions ofboth the majority and dissent dealt at length
with the properconstruction of the statute. A detailed analysis of this technical issue is beyond the scope of
this Note.
However, as a policy, it makes little sense to protect the individual's privacy in information only if the
information is physically located in a certain file. The United States Supreme Court recognized this in
connection with the federal act's enumeration of "personnel, medical, or similar files," by holding that
this phrase encompasses all information of the kind that is normally found in such files, rather than only
information actually located in the files themselves. Department of State v. Washington Post Co., 456
U.S. 595, 601 (1982).
Applying the exemption to information, wherever located, does not mean that the exemption should
operate to exclude large amounts of information. The articulated policy of Washington's FOIA is both to
disclose most information and to protect privacy. WASH. Rev. CODE§ 42.17.010(11) (1985). The privacy
exemption should also comport with the FOIA's primary purpose of assuring easy access to most
government-held information.
43. Rosier, 105 Wn. 2d at 612,717 P.2d at 1357.
44. Id. at 612,614,717 P.2d at 1357-58.
45. Id. at 612-13,717 P.2d at 1358.
46. Id. at 614-15,717 P.2d at 1359.
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III. ANALYSIS
Washington's Freedom of Information Act articulates a desire to protect
a right to privacy.47 Privacy, however, is a broad and ill-defined legal
concept. 48 The FOIA affects an individual's privacy because it requires the
government to disclose information it has acquired about the individual,
upon a third party's request. 49 Unless information is exempt, the individual
loses control over its further dissemination when he or she discloses it to the
government. This interest in controlling the dissemination of information
about oneself has been described as "informational privacy." 50 Therefore,
the court's interpretation of the FOIA privacy exemption determines the
extent to which an individual is entitled to informational privacy.
The Washington Supreme Court in Rosier recognized that its original
interpretation of the privacy exemption in Hearst did not adequately
protect informational privacy. 51 However, in its effort to correct the inade-
quacies of the Hearst test, the court erred. Its new interpretation of the
privacy exemption is excessively broad. 52 It subjects too much information
to a balancing test that both inadequately protects privacy and does not
ensure free and open access to most government-held information. 53 The
privacy exemption should be interpreted to exclude information only in
specific instances, but should protect such information strictly. 54 Such an
interpretation would best resolve the tension between open access and
individual privacy that underlies Washington's FOIA.
47. WASH. REV. CODE§§ 42.17.010(11), .260(I), .310(l)(a)-(e)(1985).
48. Gavison. PrivacY and the Limits ofLaw, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 422 & n.9 (1980); Gerety. Redefining
Privacy, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 233, 234 (1977); Comment, The Interest in Limited Disclosure of
Personallnformation:A ConstitutionalAnalysis, 36 VAND. L. REV. 139,143 n.23 (1983). Widelycredited
with originating the idea that privacy deserves legal protection is Warren & Brandeis, Tite Right to
Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). But see Comment, The Right to Privacy in Nineteenth Century
America, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1892 (1981).
This vagueness is partly because the explicit protection of privacy as a distinct interest has not had a long
history in the American legal tradition. Torts such as battery or trespass protect the individual's privacy by
protecting the individual's interest in avoiding harm to his person or property. At common law, though.
privacy never received legal protection in its own right, absent violation of some other tangible interest.
See Pratt, The Warren and Brandeis Argument for a Right to Privacy, 1975 PUB. L. 161.
49. See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
50. A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967); see also A. MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY:
COMPUTERS, DATA BANKS, AND DOSSIERS 25 (1977); Lusky, In'asion of Privacy: A Clarification of
Concepts, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 693, 693-95 (1972).
51. See infra notes 55-66 and accompanying text.
52. See infra notes 75-104 and accompanying text.
53. See infra notes 105-17 and accompanying text.
54. For example, the privacy exemption should protect information when the government has
illicitly acquired it, has promised confidentiality, or when disclosure would affect the exercise of funda-
mental rights. See infra notes 118-32 and accompanying text.
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A. The Hearst Test
In Rosier, the Washington Supreme Court rejected the privacy test it had
earlier articulated in Hearst Corp. v. Hoppe.55 The Hearst test involved two
criteria. First, disclosure of the information in question had to be highly
offensive to a reasonable person.56 Second, the private nature of the
information had to outweigh the public interest in its disclosure.57
The Hearst test derived from Prosser's tort of the publication of embar-
rassing private facts. 58 However, the Hearst court's reliance on Prosser's
tort was misplaced. The tort, in addition to the two criteria incorporated
into the Hearst test, also required that such information be published. 59 The
tort provided no remedy when information was merely disclosed to a few
individuals. 60
The publication requirement shows that the tort does not attempt to
protect an individual's interest in informational privacy. Rather, it protects
the individual's interest in anonymity, in not being the subject of wide-
spread attention. 61 In the tort context, an objective standard-that the
information published must be highly offensive to a reasonable individ-
ual-is appropriate. It ensures there is no remedy unless the published
information fastens the public's attention upon the individual. 62 Informa-
55. 90 Wn. 2d 123,580 P.2d 246(1978).
56. Hearst, 90 Wn. 2d at 135,580 P.2d at 253.
57. Id. at 136, 580 P.2d at 253.
58. "Inasmuch as the statute contains no definition of the term. . . [t]he most applicable privacy
right would appear to be that expressed in tort law." Id. at 135, 580 P.2d at 253.
59. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383,393 (1960); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) oFToeRs § 652D
(1977).
60. See w. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEE N ON TORTS § 117 (5th ed. 1984); see also Zimmerman,
RequiemforaHeavyweight:A Farewellto Warren andBrandeis'sPrivacy Tort, 68 CORNELLL. REv. 291,
337-41 (1983) (arguing that the tort's publication requirement is an artificial device, which "exists solely
to cut off an intolerably attractive invitation to the hypersensitive and litigious, and not in response to valid
differences in the capacity of public versus private gossip to cause harm").
61. If the information is not widely disseminated, then the individual's ability to move about freely
without undue attention being paid to him or her remains intact. See Gavison, supra note 48, at 432-33.
Zimmerman, in her article dismissing the viability of the tort, characterizes the interest it protects as
"selective anonymity," or the ability to "control the circles within which the details of our lives and
characters are disseminated." Zimmerman, supra note 60, at 338. However, the interest the tort recog-
nizes is not that of control, but of retaining the individual's ability to interact anonymously with strangers.
Bloustein came closer to a correct characterization when he stated that the tort protected the individual
from being made a "public spectacle against his will." Bloustein, Privacy, Tort Law, and the Constitu-
tion:Is Warren andfBrandeis' Tort Petty and Unconstitutional as Well?, 46TEx. L. REv. 611,619 (1968).
62. An objective standard-that a reasonable (average) person must find the information highly
offensive-ensures that the public pays attention to and stigmatizes the individual. The effect which
disclosure must have upon the public's attention can be likened to the reaction when someone shouts,
"Here is the President!" See Gavison, supra note48, at 432; see also Powers, Privacy andthe Communi-
cationsMedia:Public Events, Private Lives in PRIvAcY: A VANISHING VALUE? 230 (W. Biered. 1980) (an
anecdotal discussion). The disclosure must also stigmatize the individual so as to unfavorably interfere
with his or her opportunity to interact anonymously with the public.
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tion might be offensive to a particular individual. The one publishing the
information may know that it is offensive to that particular individual.
However, unless the information is highly offensive to a reasonable individ-
ual, the public has not had their attention directed to the individual. 63 His or
her anonymity is not destroyed, so the law provides no remedy.
Taken out of context, the Hearst criteria did not adequately encompass
the informational privacy interests that the FOIA exemption should protect.
The Hearst test, because it ensured that most information would be dis-
closed, fit well with the FOIA's intent to provide free and open access to
government-held information. 64 However, since the privacy exemption was
not intended to protect merely anonymity, 65 the exemption's requirement
that information be highly offensive to a reasonable person did not properly
distinguish private and nonprivate information. Because the exemption did
not address the individual's interest in informational privacy, properly
excludable information could not be protected. 66 The Hearst test inade-
quately protected legitimate informational privacy interests.
B. The Rosier Privacy Exemption Test
In its effort to encompass legitimate privacy interests left unprotected by
the earlier privacy exemption, the Rosier court went too far. The court
stated that information which is readily identifiable to an individual, and
which reveals a unique fact having social implications, is exempt if the
information's private nature outweighs the public interest in disclosure. 67
The court's new test focuses excessively on the FOIA's subsidiary desire to
respect privacy, emasculating the act's primary purpose of providing easy
and open access to government-held information. First, the courts broad
63. See, e.g., Daily Times Democrat v. Graham, 276 Ala. 380, 162 So. 2d 474 (1964) (damages
awarded against newspaper which published picture of plaintiff with dress blown up over her head at
county fair, even though thousands were present at the time); Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., 113 F.2d 806
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 711(1940) (no damages for article recounting history ofchild prodigyand
describing his current whereabouts, eccentricities, etc.); Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 91
(1931) (damages awarded for movie made about murder trial of former prostitute since reformed).
64. See, e.g., Columbian Publishing Co. v. City of Vancouver, 36 Wn. App. 25,671 P.2d 280 (1983);
Van Buren v. Miller, 22 Wn. App. 836, 592 P.2d 671 (1979). The lower courts applied the Hearst test,
found the information not to be highly offensive, and therefore compelled disclosure.
65. The vast majority of information disclosed under the FOIA is neither of the kind that might cause
such a loss of anonymity, nor disseminated to more than a few individuals. Moreover, the potential harm
to anonymity comes not from the first disclosure by the government to an individual, but from a further
publication by the individual to the public at large.
66. The privacy exemption as interpreted in Hearst did not include information disclosed in a
recognized confidential relationship, or information suggesting improper discrimination. See infra notes
123-32 and accompanying text. The test only looked to the information's content, and not the context in
which it had been disclosed.
67. Rosier, 105 Wn. 2d at 612, 717 P.2d at 1357.
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redefinition does not adequately delineate what information may or may not
implicate a privacy interest. 68 Second, by increasing the amount of infor-
mation that may implicate a privacy interest, the new definition necessitates
increased resort to a balancing test. A balancing test compels inquiry into
the purposes for which the information will be used, contrary to the spirit of
the act.69 Such a test inherently begets unpredictable results. 70 This unpre-
dictability will enable an agency to misuse the privacy exemption to
frustrate the FOIA's policy of open access to information. 71 Washington
needs to adopt a privacy exemption test which better conforms to the spirit
of its FOIA. Informational privacy ought to be protected only when
justified by special circumstances, such as when the government itself has
illicitly acquired the information, 72 when the government has agreed not to
disclose the information in order to foster more accurate disclosure,73 or
when disclosure would have a chilling effect on the exercise of fundamental
rights. 74
1. Distinguishing Private Information Under the Rosier Test
An initial difficulty in applying Washington's new privacy exemption
test is determining whether government-held information implicates a
privacy interest at all. 75 The court stated that any information linked to a
particular individual, which "identifies particular, identifiable persons as
somehow unique from most society," implicates a privacy interest.
76
Information, then, must initially satisfy two criteria to meet the Rosier test.
First, the information must be linked to a specific individual. 77 Second, the
information must have social implications distinguishing that individual as
somehow unique from the rest of society.78 These criteria are ambiguous,
and potentially subject to an overly broad interpretation.
68. See infra notes 75-98 and accompanying text.
69. See infra notes 99-104 and accompanying text.
70. See infra note 106 and accompanying text.
71. See infra notes 111-14 and accompanying text.
72. See infra notes 121-22 and accompanying text.
73. See infra notes 123-27 and accompanying text.
74. See infra notes 128-31 and accompanying text.
75. Under the new privacy exemption test, information must first be linked to a specific individual
and must reveal a unique fact or have social implications. Only information meeting these criteria has its
private nature weighed against the public interest in its disclosure. Rosier, 105 Wn. 2d at 612, 717 P.2d at
1357.
76. Id. The court later stated that "an individual has a privacy interest whenever information which
reveals unique facts about those named is linked to an identifiable individual." Id. at 613,717 P.2d at 1358.
77. See infra notes 79-86 and accompanying text.
78. See infra notes 87-91 and accompanying text.
265
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It is not always easy to determine whether information can be readily
linked to a specific individual. Some statements clearly do link an individ-
ual with a piece of information. 79 However, the court did not indicate just
how specific the identification must be. 80 Information sometimes is linked
not to one individual, but to more. 81 Is information about a few individuals
sufficiently linked to a specific individual to implicate a privacy interest
under the court's test?82 If so, at what point does the class become large
enough so that the information is no longer private? 83
It is likewise unclear whether information linked to a specific, but
unnamed individual satisfies this prong of the court's test.84 Whether such
information is deemed private would seem to depend on how identifiable it
appears to make the individual. 85 In reality, though, if the requestor
actually possesses enough independent information, so that the additional
79. For example, the statement "Joe owns a gun" clearly links an identity-Joe-with a piece of
information-ownership of a gun.
80. The court first stated that the information had to be matched to "a particular individual's name."
Rosier, 105 Wn. 2d at 609, 717 P.2d at 1356. Later, it stated that disclosure had to identify "particular.
identifiable persons. " Id. at 612,717 P.2d at 1357. Then, information hadtobe "specificallyidentified to a
particular individual's name." Id. at 613, 717 P.2d at 1358 (emphasis in original). Finally, it must be
"linked to an identifiable individual." Id.
81. For example, "Either Joe or Jack owns a gun."
82. The court held that the release of the names and addresses of the utility district's customers did
link names with information. Rosier, 105 Wn. 2d at 612,717 P.2d at 1357. However, this is functionally
equivalent to a series of specific names matched with specific information, as one learns something
definite with each name, i.e., the individual's address and the fact that he or she is the public utility's
customer. In the example above, one only learns a probability, that there is a fifty percent chance Joe owns
the gun.
The United States Supreme Court, although acknowledging that the threat posed by potential identi-
fication "cannot be rejected as trivial" and that redaction, or the elimination ofnames, "cannot eliminate
all risks ofidentifiability," has interpreted the federal exemption's requirement that disclosure be "clearly
unwarranted" to require a threat to privacy "more palpable than mere possibilities." Department of the
Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 380-81 & n. 19 (1976).
83. In a certain sense, the statement "someone owns a gun" reveals information that is linked to every
individual-anyone could possibly own that gun. Such information is intuitively not private.
84. Gavison relates the following example:
Consider the famous anecdote about the priest who was asked, at a party, whether he had heard any
exceptional stories during confessionals. "In fact," the priest replied, "my first confessor is a good
example, since he confessed to a murder." A few minutes later, an elegant man joined the group, saw
the priest, and greeted him warmly. When asked how he knew the priest, the man replied: "Why, I
had the honor of being his first confessor."
Gavison, supra note 48, at 430-31.
The priest revealed information linked to a specific person. Query whether the information, which the
priest assumed could not be matched to the individual, was sufficiently identifiable to satisfy the Rosier
test?
85. The statement "the 3,264,198th person to visit the Empire State Building owns a gun" links
information to a specific individual, but the identity of that person is presumably unascertainable. One
suspects that the court would hold that this information does not meet the first prong of its test. The
difference, however, between this and the priest's first confessor is just one of degree.
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information permits the identification of the individual, then linkage oc-
curs. 86 Thus, whether information is "linked" to a specific individual
depends on how much other information the requestor, and others, already
have or might obtain. A great deal of information therefore could be
considered potentially linked to an individual.
The second criterion the Rosier court articulated as necessary to impli-
cate a privacy interest is similarly ambiguous. Private information, accord-
ing to the Rosier test, must also have "social implications" setting an
individual apart as "somehow unique from most of society." 87 It is not
clear how unique the information must be, however, or what social implica-
tions it must have, in order to satisfy this test. For example, males constitute
only about 49% of the total population.8 8 Maleness therefore distinguishes
one as being unique from most of society, 89 and it certainly has social
implications. 90 The supreme court, however, presumably did not intend to
86. Whether a statement is "readily identifiable" to an individual thus depends on how much other
information one assumes is known. In the previous example, if one knows that the 3,264,198th visitor to
the Empire State Building is Joe, the information becomes readily identifiable to Joe.
Federal courts often attempt to sanitize, by eliminating identifying details, information disclosed
underthe federal FOIA. At leastone court, though, has acknowledged thedifficulties inherentin thistask:
The problems in undertaking to decide which portions of an employee's statement may be released to
his employer without revealing that employee's identity are enormous, if, indeed, not insoluble.
Merely deleting the name from the statement would not insure against identification, since the
employee's narrative, or part of it, may be such that the employer could identify the employee
involved, or could narrow the group down to two or three employees. Moreover, it is doubtful
whether the court could select which portions to release with the degree of certainty required
adequately to protect the interests of employees who wish to avoid identification.
Harvey's Wagon Wheel, Inc. v. NLRB, 91 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2410,2415 (N.D. Cal. 1976), remandedin
part on other grounds, 550F.2d 1139 (9thCir. 1976);see also Andrews v. Veterans Administration, 613 F.
Supp. 1404 (D. Wyo. 1985) (awarding damages against agency for improperly sanitizing files). But see
Citizens for Envtl. Quality, Inc. v. USDA, 602 F. Supp. 534 (D. D.C. 1984) (summary judgment
compelling disclosure of urinalysis test results on a specific, but unnamed, individual granted on basis
that no invasion of privacy was shown, despite affidavits stating that the identity of the individual tested
could be "readily deduced" and that speculation as to subject of test had already "focused on two
individuals").
87. Rosier, 105 Wn. 2dat612,717 P.2d at 1357. Thecourtalternativelyphrased itas "revealsunique
facts about those named." Id. at 613,717 P.2d at 1358.
88. Males constitute 48.58%, and females 51.42%, of the total United States population. 1986
VORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FAcrs 258.
89. One dictionary defines unique as follows: "1. one and only; single; sole. 2. different from all
others; having no like or equal. 3. singular; unusual; extraordinary; rare: still regarded by some as an
objectionable usage." WFSER'S NEw UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1999 (2d ed. 1983).
Clearly, the court did not mean unique in the first or second sense, as it required such information to
distinguish the individual as being "somehow unique from most of society." Rosier, 105 Wn. 2d at 612,
717 P.2d 1357 (emphasis added). Therefore, thecourt has to have meantthat information mustdistinguish
the individual as being unusual from most of society. Rosier leaves the question of how unusual un-
answered.
90. For example, only males must register for the draft. 50 U.S.C. app. § 453 (1981).
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suggest that a statement linking identity with gender implicates privacy
interests. 91
The court's application of its criteria to the facts of Rosier shed little light
on what the court meant. The court held that the lists of names and
addresses of utility customers, while linking names with information,
neither identified those named as being somehow unique from most of
society, nor had social implications. 92 Disclosure of a specific individual's
power records, though, did satisfy the criteria for implicating a privacy
interest. 93 The court stated that suspiciously high power usage was a
"unique fact." 94
The court's articulated standard does not adequately explain these dif-
ferent results. The fact that an individual is a customer of a particular public
utility does have potential social implications, 95 and probably does dis-
tinguish him from most of society. 96 Similarly, any individuals power
usage records will also be unique,97 and may have a variety of social
implications. 98 Certainly, the power usage records are more unique and
have more obvious social implications than the list of utility customers. The
point, however, is that the difference between the two is not one of
definition, as the Rosier court purports, but merely one of degree. There-
fore, some other criteria must distinguish the two results.
Analysis of the decision suggests that the distinguishing criteria is the
possibility of misuse of the information by the requestor. Rosier's request
was clearly for the purpose of putting together a mailing list for his political
campaign. 99 No improper use of the information readily suggested itself to
the court. 100 In analyzing the police department's request, however, the
court assumed that the information sought would reveal suspiciously high
91. If taken literally, the court's requirement that information be unique would mean that a statement
such as "Joe is a male" implicates a privacy interest while the statement "Judy is a female" would not
implicate a privacy interest, since that fact does not distinguish her from most of society. Such a result is
clearly absurd.
92. Rosier, 105 Wn. 2d at 612-13,717 P.2d at 1358.
93. Id. at 614,717 P.2d at 1358-59.
94. Id.
95. For example, being the customer ofa particular utility reveals the individual's selection ofenergy
sources, and perhaps something about his or her attitude toward conservation.
96. Snohomish County's total population in 1985 was 373,000. The Snohomish County P.U.D.
served 148,867 individual customers. SNOHOMISH COUNTY PUBLIC UTILITY DISTRICT 1985 ANNUAL
REPORT 35. As this is less than halfthe population, this makes the utility customerat least slightly unusual.
97. In this case, the information might even be unique in the primary sense of the term, as no two
individuals likely will have identical histories of power consumption.
98. For example, one might infer that the individual is likely engaged in growing controlled sub-
stances, as thecourtassumed the policedepartment woulddo. Rosier, 105 Wn. 2dat 615,717 P.2dat 1359.
99. Id. at 608, 717 P.2d at 1355.
100. Id. at 612-13,717 P.2d at 1358.
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power usage, since this was the purpose behind the request. 01 The per-
ceived likelihood of subsequent misuse by the police, who had requested
the information, apparently caused the court to hold that a privacy interest
inhered. 10 2 Having held that the information met the threshold definition
implicating privacy interests, the court could then engage in a balancing
test, enabling it to delineate the circumstances under which release of the
information would be proper. 10 3 Therefore, any information which the
court feels a requestor might possibly misuse may be sufficiently private to
warrant the application of the balancing test. 104 The new privacy exemption
test announced in Rosier encompasses, and thus potentially excludes, more
information than appropriate from Washington's FOIA.
2. Balancing Tests and the FOIA's Privacy Exemption
The balancing test the court adopted in Rosier also contradicts the intent
underlying Washington's FOIA for several reasons. First, the balancing test
itself is inherently inaccurate and unpredictable. Balancing necessitates an
evaluation of the magnitude of each interest involved, so that one can
meaningfully decide which interest prevails over the other. However,
because nonexempt information must be released to any person, the court
must evaluate the possibility of the information's misuse by any member of
the public. This is simply an impossible task. 105
101. Id. at 614-15, 717 P.2d at1359.
102. The court stated that the individual has a privacy interest in "preventing general 'fishing
expeditions' by the governmental authorities." Id. at 615,717 P.2d at 1359. This statement anticipates that
the policewould take furtheraction againstthe individual on the basis ofthe information they obtained, for
example, by searching the premises.
The court is confusing the different privacy interests involved. If it wishes to ensure that the police will
not intrusively invade the individual's privacy, the court should prohibit such conduct directly by holding
that this information does not constitute sufficient probable cause on which to issue a warrant. In fact, in a
case decided subsequent to Rosier, the court did so rule. See State v. Huft, 106 Wn. 2d 206, 720 P.2d 838
(1986). So, the individual's privacy interest in preventing a "general fishing expedition," while valid, is
not an informational privacy interest which warrants a denial of disclosure.
103. "If the police have an articulable suspicion of illegal acts, the release ofrecords leads to effective
law enforcement, thereby furthering the public interest." Rosier, 105 Wn. 2dat614-15,717 P.2dat 1359.
104. The test thus circumvents the FOIA's policy of disclosure to any person, without regard to the
purpose of therequestor. See supra notes 25-27. Information is private because it maybe misused, and its
private nature (the possibility of its misuse against the individual) is weighed against the public interest in
disclosure. This enables the court to consider the purpose for which the information is requested on the
privacy side of the balancing test, ratherthan in evaluating the quantumof "public interest," which would
be contrary to the act's mandate of disclosure "to any person." The second prong of the Rosier test
therefore becomes whether information is sufficiently unique to permit its misuse. But information is
always potentially subject to misuse by someone.
105. What courts faced with this task really do is select a small, inherently arbitrary sample of the
possible misuses to which any information might be put, and compare that to a similarly arbitrary sample
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Principled balancing therefore necessarily entails limiting the examina-
tion of the interests involved to specific public benefits and specific invas-
ions of privacy resulting from disclosure to specific persons for specific
purposes. In turn, this necessitates limiting the actual disclosure of the
information to those persons and purposes. Since such limited disclosure is
contrary to the policy of disclosure "to any person," either balancing or
unlimited disclosure must give way. Federal courts have resolved this
contradiction by purporting to consider the generalized public interest in
disclosure. At the same time, however, they accord heavy, often decisive,
weight to the individual requestor's specific purpose. 106
The differing language of Washington's FOIA, however, should be
interpreted to avoid adoption of the federal FOIA's balancing approach.
Washington's FOIA does track the language of the federal FOIA in mandat-
ing disclosure to "any person." 07 Therefore, Washington's FOIA should
be interpreted similarly to the federal act in this respect, 0 8 to require
disclosure without inquiry into the purpose for which any information is
requested. However, Washington's FOIA employs an "unreasonable invas-
ion" standard to exempt information as private. 10 9 Because it avoids
"clearly unwarranted," Washington's FOIA should be interpreted to avoid
the balancing process used in interpreting the federal FOIA's privacy
exemption, and the concomitant need to evaluate the purpose for which any
information is requested. 10 Washington's privacy exemption should not be
interpreted to call for a balancing test.
of the public benefits that might accrue through disclosure. One judge acknowledged the quixotic nature
of this task:
If the lower courts find it difficult to agree as to whether a specific public benefit is outweighed by a
specific invasion of privacy, how can they possibly balance hypothetical public benefits against
hypothetical invasions ofprivacy? The ease with which such a vague hypothetical balancing test can
be manipulated is obvious. By failing to mention beneficial uses to which some members of the
public might put the information, and emphasizing the dangers of a "computerized dossier" that
some members of the public might create . . . , [the] conclusion is foreordained.
Kestenbaum v. Michigan State Univ., 327 N.W.2d 783,799 (Mich. 1982) (Ryan, J.. dissenting) (empha-
sis in original, footnotes omitted).
In fact, this language is too harsh. The problem is not that judges choose to ignore some possibilities so
as to manipulate the test. They simply cannot help but do so. Accurate evaluation of the public orprivate
interests involved in disclosure to the general public is inherently impossible.
106. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
107. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.270 (1985).
108. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
109. WASH. REV. CODE§ 42.17.260() (1985).
110. While comparison with the federal FOIA shows an intent to reject the balancing test used by
federal courts, it does not necessarily follow that the use ofthe phrase "unreasonable invasion" rejects all
possible balancing tests. The phrase could suggest a balancing where the scales are not so clearly tipped in
favor of disclosure. However, the federal FOIA provides anotherexample of a balancing test which is not
so strongly tilted in favor of disclosure. The investigatory record exemption of the federal act, 5 U.S.C.
270
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Second, the Rosier balancing test contradicts the intent underlying
Washington's FOIA by tempting agencies to make use of its ambiguity and
unpredictability. Since balancing necessitates a subjective evaluation of the
interests involved, an agency could almost always articulate arguably
sufficient grounds for suppressing any information. "'1 This very problem of
agency abuse is what originally caused Congress to adopt the federal
FOIA.112 While Washington's FOIA does envision agencies making an
initial determination,"13 the court in Rosier belittled the substantial danger
involved in placing the highly subjective evaluations implicit in its new test
in the hands of the agency. 114 Giving agencies such discretion contradicts
the FOIA's purpose of assuring free and open access to information.
Finally, by applying a balancing test, the Rosier court recognized a right
to informational privacy. However, informational privacy does not deserve
§ 552(b)(7) (1977), provides forexemption of information whose disclosure would merely bean "unwar-
ranted" invasion of personal privacy. Since Washington's FOIA also declined to follow this example, the
choice of the words "unreasonable invasion" ought to be given a different construction. The Washington
Supreme Court has implicitly recognized this twice, in Hearst and in Rosier, by refusing to adopt the
federal act's balancing test.
Moreover, if the drafters of Washington's FOIA intended to reject balancing, they had little choice but
to use a phrase like "unreasonable invasion." Merely exempting information which constitutes an
invasion of privacy would exempt too much, including all information which could be linked to an
individual. But no alternative existed which recognized the specific interest in informational privacy and
attempted to distinguish in a principled way cases where disclosure would and would not be reasonable.
Assuming this to be the case, then, the drafters could only articulate a rather vague desire to prevent
"unreasonable invasions" of privacy and leave it to the courts to determine, within the parameters of free
and open access to most information, what kind of disclosures constitute such an invasion.
111. OnecourtopenlyacknowledgedthatthefederalFOIA, incallingfora"discretionarybalancing
of competing interests [is] necessarily. . . inconsistent with the purpose of the Act to give agencies, and
courts as well, definitive guidelines in setting information policies." Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670,674
n. 10 (D. D.C. 1971); see also Nader, FreedomfromInformation: theAct andtheAgencies, 5 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REv. 1, 14 (1970) ("The FOIA will remain putty in the hands of government personnel unless its
provisions are given authoritative and concrete interpretation by the courts.").
112. See supra note 24.
113. WASH. REv. CODE § 42.17.260(l) (1985).
114. "[T]he releasing agency must examine the context. . . .[It] must then analyze the propriety
of disclosure. . . .[It] must weigh the privacy interest against the public interest .... "Rosier, 105
Wn. 2d at 612, 717 P.2d at 1357. "Although this burden might seem onerous, the agency is best suited to
determine whether the facts warrant an exemption." Id. at 60 n. 1, 717 P.2d at 1357 n. 1.
The dissent, on the other hand, feared that the new privacy exemption would transform the" 'freedom
of information act' into a 'government censorship of public records act'." Id. at 618, 717 P.2d at 1360
(Andersen, J., dissenting). Committing this discretion to the agency would make "every employee of a
public agency a 1-person censor...." Id. at 629, 717 P.2d at 1367 (Andersen, J., dissenting).
In fact, the court had a good example of the potential for overly broad agency interpretation in the facts
before it. Rosierwas appealing the utility board's decision to deny him access to its records. This not only
protected whatever privacy interest the utility's customers had, but also prevented Rosier from obtaining
efficient access to the electorate, so that he could challenge the policies of the incumbent board members.
Although Rosier eventually vindicated his right to the records, the election had long since been held by the
time the court ordered disclosure.
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legal protection for its own sake. Informational privacy means that individ-
uals are able to control what information about them is released. 115 Individ-
uals will naturally manipulate the information disseminated to suppress
that which is unfavorable to them. 116 Decision makers dealing with such
individuals will be denied access to relevant information with which they
could make more accurate decisions. 117 Since informational privacy is in
general inefficient, it should not receive legal protection simply for its own
sake.
C. Properly Protecting Privacy
A proper privacy exemption would recognize that an individual's interest
in informational privacy does deserve legal protection when it promotes
some other important interest. At least three sets of circumstances can be
recognized as readily justifying informational privacy. First, according the
individual a right to informational privacy is the only appropriate remedy
against the government's illicit acquisition of information about the indi-
vidual. 118 Second, informational privacy sometimes promotes efficiency,
by encouraging complete and accurate disclosure of information which an
individual would not otherwise cooperate in disclosing. 19 Finally, infor-
mational privacy can be an instrument for the protection of other funda-
mental rights. 120 A privacy test which exempted information satisfying
these specific criteria would adequately protect against "unreasonable
invasions" of privacy while still comporting with the FOIA's main goal of
providing free and open access to government-held information.
The privacy exemption should prevent the government from disseminat-
ing information, illicitly or intrusively acquired from the individual. Infor-
mation, unlike something tangible, cannot be returned to remedy its
improper acquisition. 121 Therefore, the law should give the injured party at
least the right to suppress further dissemination of such information.122
115. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
116. Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 GA. L. REv. 393, 399 (1978); see also Thomson, The Right to
Privacy, 4 PHIL. AND PUB. AtF. 295 (1975).
117. Posner, supra note 116, at 399-400.
118. See infra notes 121-22 and accompanying text.
119. See infra notes 123-27 and accompanying text.
120. See infra notes 128-31 and accompanying text.
121. The law cannot "unring the bell." Maness v. Myers, 419 U.S. 449, 460 (1975); see Gerety,
supra note 48, at 285-86 & n. 191.
122. Information obtained by an unreasonable government search or seizure, for example, ought to
be suppressed regardless of its content if the law truly is operating to protect the individual's privacy
rights. In Providence Journal Co. v. FBI, 602F.2d 1010(lstCir. 1979), cert. denied, 444U.S. 1071(1980),
the court held that information obtained as a result of an illegal government search was exempt from
disclosure under the federal FOIA. The opinion below had approved disclosure, looking only at the
information's content. In reversing, the court admitted that "no other court has exempted information
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Exempting such information does not violate the FOIA's spirit of free and
open access, as the government ought not to have acquired the information
in the first place. 123
In addition, granting individuals informational privacy sometimes pro-
motes efficiency by encouraging the accurate disclosure of information
which might otherwise remain undisclosed. Individuals control a great deal
of information which others cannot easily obtain without that individual's
cooperation. 124 Often, the individual would not cooperate in disclosing the
information if he or she thought it likely that it would freely circulate after
disclosure. 125 If providing the government with accurate information is
sufficiently important, then the legislature ought to give the individual the
ability to suppress the further dissemination of such information.126 The
specific privacy exemptions of Washington's FOIA should only protect
information disclosed by the individual for the purpose of, for example,
tinder [an FOIA privacy exemption] solely on the ground that the manner in which the information was
obtained forbids release, instead of balancing on the basis of the actual contents of the requested
material." Id. at 1014 (citations omitted).
If the purpose of the exclusionary rule is merely to deter police misconduct, however, then the use of
such illegally obtained information in forums other than the courtroom should not be prohibited. See
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (purposeis deterrence, so information illegally seizedby police may
be used by IRS in separate investigation).
Since Washington's exclusionary rule is intended to protect privacy, Washington's FOIA ought to
exempt information from disclosure which is obtained through unreasonable government search and
seizure. State v. Bonds, 98 Wn. 2d. 1 (1982); see Note, The Origin and Development of Washington's
IndependentExciusionaryRule: ConstitutionalRightandConstitutionallyCompelledRemedy 61 WASH.
L. REv. 459 (1986).
123. The original reasonableness ofa search may depend on the provisions the governmenthas taken
to guard against the further dissemination of the information. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977);
Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
124. This kind of information would include, for example, medical information, information neces-
sary to qualify for welfare benefits, or tax information. See WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.310 (1985).
125. In an economic sense, informational privacy reduces the transaction costs of the communica-
tion. See Posner, supra note 116, at 401-02.
126. This is the rationale traditionally recognized to explain evidentiary privileges. Privileges
operate to suppress relevant evidence from being admitted in court. "Their warrant is the protection of
interests and relationships which, rightly or wrongly, are regarded as of sufficient social importance to
justify some sacrifice of availability of evidence relevant to the administration of justice." E. CLEARY,
MCCORMICK's HANDBOOK OFTHE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 72 (3d ed. 1984). In the context of the FOIA, the
availability of government-held information to the public, rather than to the administrators of justice, is
sacrificed.
The appropriate party to make this determination is the legislature, not the agency. Agencies naturally
tend to apply exemptions in a way that benefits them. See supra notes 111-14 and accompanying text.
Since informational privacyreduces the costs of thecommunication to theindividual, and hence increases
the accuracy of the information the agency receives, the agency would always want to afford informa-
tional privacy to the individual. But the proper question is not whether informational privacy makes for
more accurate disclosure, but whether the benefits of the increased accuracy outweigh the benefits of
broad disclosure of government-held information. This is a legislative decision. See, e.g., Van Buren v.
Miller, 22 Wn. App. 836, 592 P.2d 671 (1979) (court rejected a tax assessor's argument that disclosure
would make obtaining accurate tax information more difficult).
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receiving medical care or welfare benefits or determining taxes, rather than
protecting any information which is physically contained in such files. 127
Finally, informational privacy limits the ability of others to discriminate
efficiently against the individual. 128 An individual may engage in conduct
which society ought to promote, or at least protect. 129 If direct legal
protection is impossible or inadequate, 30 the government should not
disseminate information, the disclosure of which would have a "chilling
effect" upon the exercise of fundamental rights. For example, the dis-
closure of a list of the members of the NAACP would tend to restrict the
exercise of free speech. 131
IV. CONCLUSION
The Washington Supreme Court correctly rejected the privacy exemp-
tion test articulated in Hearst because it insufficiently protected legitimate
informational privacy interests. The Rosier test, however, overly protects
127. Such an interpretation comports with the language of the statute, which does not exempt all
information found in such files, but only information whose disclosure would violate the individual's
right to privacy. This analysis would also exempt information given for such purposes, even if it was
located in a place other than the file. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
128. Informational privacy is inefficient, in that it denies decision makers access to information with
which they could more efficiently allocate resources. See supra note 116 and accompanying text. Most
human activity presumably ought to be promoted so that, in general, efficiency is desirable. However, if
the activity in question is one society desires to discourage, then it ought to make it as inefficient, and
hence difficult, as possible.
129. Forexample, one may engage in unpopularpolitical speech. See infra note 130 and accompany-
ing text. This may have been the kind of privacy interest the Rosier court attempted to encompass by
finding a privacy interest in information about an individual which reveals a unique fact and has social
implications. See supra note 102.
130. According informational privacy to an activity that can be directly protected may just reduce
society's incentive to take corrective measures which directly protect the activity. If discrimination
against a certain group should be ended, the law should prohibit the discrimination, rather than just assist
members of the group to keep their status secret.
For example, the law may protect AIDS carriers against improper discrimination by directly prohibit-
ing certain decision making based on such knowledge. Or, it could accord AIDS carriers informational
privacy so that decision makers did not have the knowledge with which to improperly discriminate. The
problem with the latter approach is that the suppressed information may be legitimately relevant to some
decisions. For example, blood banks properly discriminate against AIDS patients in not accepting their
donated blood. See Gavison, supra note 48, at 452-54.
131. Alabama ex rel. Patterson v. NAACP, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); see also Committee on Masonic
Homes v. NLRB, 556 F.2d 214 (3d Cir. 1977) (disclosure of the names of individuals who signed union
authorization cards would "chill" the exercise of a right to organize, frustrating a statutorily enacted
policy ofsecret balloting); Philadelphia Yearly Meeting of the Religious Soc'y ofFriends v. Tate, 519 F.2d
1335 (3d Cir. 1975) (police accumulation of publicly available information on citizen's group not an
invasion of privacy, but subsequent disclosure to non-law enforcement entities may present invasion of
the plaintiff's associational rights). Compare Industrial Found. v. Texas Indus. Accident Bd., 540
S.W.2d 668 (Tex. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 931 (1977) (although disclosure might chill individual
from exercising statutory right to file workman's compensation claim, such a right is not fundamental).
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the individual's informational privacy. Too much information potentially
falls within the court's broad redefinition of privacy interests. Con-
sequently, too much information is subjected to the vagaries of an impossi-
bly imprecise balancing test. Moreover, there is no sound policy reason for
the court to broadly protect a right to informational privacy.
The FOIA's privacy exemption ought to be interpreted to protect
information only in specific instances, without resort to a nebulous balanc-
ing test. Such an interpretation would comport with the intent of broad
disclosure underlying Washington's FOIA, and protect the individual's
legitimate privacy interests. The exemption should include information
illicitly acquired by the government, disclosed in a protected relationship,
or related to undesirable discrimination. When any of these conditions are
met, there is a sound basis for denoting disclosure as unreasonable.
Otherwise, Washington's Policy of free and open access to government-
held information ought to be observed. 132
Matthew Edwards
132. The Washington Supreme Court heard oral arguments February 17th, 1987 on a case involving
the privacy exemption: Cowles Publishing Co. v. State Patrol, 44 Wn. App. 882, 724 P.2d 379 (1986),
appealgranted, 107 Wn. 2d 1006 (No. 53097-1). A newspaper made an FOIA request forpolice agency
internal affairs files. Id. at 884-85,724 P.2d at 382. These files included the testimony of accused police
officers, who are required to testify before the disciplinary board and are dismissed for asserting a
privilege against self-incrimination. Id. at 886, 724 P.2d at 383. The trial court found that
§ 42.17.310(l)(b), exempting personal information foundin public employee files to the extent disclosure
violates the right to privacy, and § 42.17.310(l)(d), similarly exempting information in investigative
files, compelled suppression of the officer's names. Id. at 887, 724 P.2d at 384. The appellate court
unanimously reversed. Id. at 898,724 P.2d at 389. That court held theRosierprivacy test inapplicable on
the novel ground that the information related to individuals involved in a governmental operation. Id.
Applying theHearst privacy exemption, the court found that the information was not "highly offensive,"
and that the public interest in disclosure outweighed whatever privacy interest the subject officers had in
the files. Id. at 892-94, 724 P.2d at 386-89.
These facts illustrate the pitfalls inherent in any kind of balancing test. The appellate court looked only
to the specific purposes for which the requesters sought the information in gauging the magnitude of the
public and private interests involved,'completely ignoring the information's potential for misuse by other
members of the public. In fact, an accurate evaluation of the magnitude of the threat to the officer's privacy
involved in disclosure to the public is well-nigh impossible.
The supreme court ought to acknowledge that the officers' legitimate informational privacy interest in
the information contained in these files is limited to information the officers themselves disclosed to the
investigators. The exemptions contained in § 42.17.310(1)(b) and (d) should be interpreted to exempt
information given by the individual to the government for the purpose of securing employment or
assisting in an investigation. Therefore, such information should be deleted from the files, with the
remainder made available to the public. This result would both protect the officer's legitimate privacy
interests and assure free and easy access to most government-held information, satisfying the spirit of
Washington's FOIA.
